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Abstract 
The central question of this article is when, how and what do governmental agencies learn from 
evaluations. A structural constructivist theoretical framework is developed and applied to two 
case studies, in both of which a report of the Dutch Court of Audit is taken as a starting point. A 
reconstruction is made of the intra- and interorganizational processes in which the impacts of 
these evaluations were socially constructed. It appears that an evaluation hardly has any direct 
effect that can be unequivocally ascribed to it. Rather, evaluations seem to support or counteract 
debates, tendencies and options already present (or ‘under construction’) in the interaction 
among actors involved. Using a structural constructivist theoretical framework we identify 
mechanisms and conditions that enhance forms of learning processes.  
 The paper concludes with some hypotheses about the genesis of evaluation impact. 
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Introduction 
Evaluation studies in the public domain may have different functions. One of them certainly is 
improvement of the object evaluated, which may be a policy or a (semi-)governmental 
organizational unit. That is, evaluation may trigger changes in policy making, management, 
procedures, implementation strategies, and so on. But when and how do they do so? Even if 
goals are fixed and results can be assessed unequivocally, it is not at all self-evident how 
evaluation results will be utilized. When are they recognized as relevant? When do they trigger 
defensive or proactive responses? How are the translated into behaviors directed at 
‘improvement’? Moreover, very often, certainly in the sphere of public administration, both 
conditions (fixed goals and unequivocal results) are not met.  
 Research on utilization of evaluation has identified a number of conditions that appear to 
stimulate utilization in one way or another. Examples are the timing of reports in relation to the 
actual stage of a policy process (Mulder, Walraven et al., 1991) (Rist, 1994: 194–199) the source 
of evaluation data (internal or external), the credibility of the source, the way of communicating 
results (Rist, 1994: 200–203), the quality of the presentation (Pröpper and De Vries, 1995), and 
whether or not there is an institutionalized evaluation practice (Leeuw and Rozendal, 1994). Oh 
(1996) develops a model in which search and utilization of knowledge in governmental 
bureaucracies is explained from characteristics of political issues, the organization, the individual 
and the information concerned. Patton (1997) points at the importance of user involvement in 
formulation central evaluation questions, choosing methods, etc.  
 However, such an inventory of conditions in itself does not explain why evaluation 
results are used in specific instances and not in other ones. On the one hand, not all conditions 
mentioned need to be met for utilization to occur. On the other hand even when a number of 
favorable conditions are in force, utilization is not guaranteed. Moreover: what is ‘utilization’? 
How are evaluation results made use of? Policy makers whose policy is being evaluated may 
react in a defensive way and try to avoid scrutiny of the evaluator. But they may also take 
evaluation studies serious and act accordingly, e.g. in conformance with suggestions the 
evaluator made. Maybe they take the evaluation serious, but draw quite different conclusions 
and consequences from it than the evaluator did. Evaluations may be used to legitimate and ‘sell’ 
policies or they may be used to change policies in a superficial or fundamental way. What does 
determine the actual reaction to and application of evaluation results?1 I try to contribute to an 
answer by conceiving of the influence of evaluation in terms of learning processes. More 
specifically I will focus on the analysis and explanation of learning processes in governmental 
units induced or enhanced by Court of Audit evaluations. 
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In the next section, I will elaborate the concept of organizational learning, and argue why I think 
it fruitful in connection with the present research questions. Next, I introduce a ‘structural-
constructivist’ theoretical framework, which will be used to describe and analyze learning 
processes in two case studies, which are summarized in the sections to follow. Both cases take 
an evaluation study of the Dutch Court of Audit as their starting point and try to reconstruct 
related learning processes in the governmental units most involved. Finally I draw some 
conclusions on the relation between evaluation and change on the organizational level. 
 
Organizational learning 
Evaluations may trigger learning on the individual level. However, in discussing the impact of 
evaluation in and on public administration, we should focus on transformation in the organization 
or behaviors of governmental units and hence on organizational learning.  
Organizational learning (Cf. Argyris, 1992) may be defined as any process of change in 
organizational structures, codes, or practices that is triggered or reinforced by new experiences, 
new interactions or new information2. Note that this definition does not say anything on the 
process itself, but only, in part, about its inputs and its results. In latter sections we turn to the 
question how these types of inputs are used to produce these results. 
 
Thinking about the impact of evaluation on governmental behavior in terms of learning processes 
has a number of advantages:   
· evaluation generates information and perhaps new interactions or experiences for the unit 
evaluated. These ‘inputs’ are implied in the concept of organizational learning; 
· the notion of learning processes draws our attention to the processing of inputs. Learning 
processes imply sensemaking and the development of new practices, often piecemeal and by 
trial and error; 
· it directs our attention to changes at the organizational level. Individual learning may 
reinforce organizational learning, but will not necessarily do so. It is therefore relevant to 
gain insight in when and how. 
There also is a disadvantage. It concerns the danger of too easily thinking of organizational 
change in anthropomorphic terms. Some (Senge, 1992) hold that organizational learning requires 
learning by individuals within the organization. But, individual learning is certainly not a sufficient 
condition for organizational learning and perhaps not even a necessary one. Hence, I do not 
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consider individual learning to be a valid metaphor for organizational transformation, but try to 
understand how collective processes of sensemaking en constructing of new behaviors take 
place3. 
 
A structural-constructivist approach 
When and how do governmental units learn from evaluations related to their organization or 
performance? It seems useful to decompose this question in a number of smaller ones: 
· when and how are evaluations identified? 
· when and how are they read or listened to? 
· how are they interpreted? 
· how do they become related to organizational characteristics or organizational behavior? 
· how do they eventually find their way to changes in organizational structure or behavior? 
Implied in all these ‘steps’ are two important ideas. The first is the notion of interpretation, or 
perhaps better the construction of meaning and behavior. Giving meaning, if only implicitly, is 
essential, because it determines whether an evaluation is recognized as relevant, how ideas of 
how it may be used are generated and how these are translated into actual practices.  
 In research on the impact of evaluation, the role of giving meaning (or sensemaking 
(Weick, 1995)) and social construction of behavior, is often neglected. This is the case in 
research in which one tries to explain the impact of evaluation from characteristics of the 
evaluation itself (its ‘quality’, its presentation) or from structural conditions (timing, embedding in 
institutionalized procedures) (Cf. Leeuw and Rozendal, 1994; Rist, 1994). In such research 
giving meaning is (implicitly) considered irrelevant, or, more probable, unproblematic. In the latter 
case it is presupposed that evaluation results are unequivocal and have the same meaning for all 
actors involved. This not only is at variance with much recent social scientific insight, but in the 
case of the impact of Court of Audit reports, also demonstrable incorrect (see cases below). 
 The second basic idea underneath the steps above is that there is a connection between 
sensemaking and organizational patterns. These patterns condition and direct sensemaking 
processes (but do not determine them fully), while at the same time sensemaking generally will 
be reflected in some measure of change in organizational culture, procedures, technology or 
structure. 
Now, my thesis is that, in order to explain the impact of evaluation, we need a better and 
more detailed understanding of processes of the construction of meaning and behavior within 
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(and between) organizations. We also need to understand the way in which these processes are 
influenced by and influence organizational patterns. Structural constructivism4 offers a fruitful 
framework to pursue this mission. 
 
Structural constructivism starts from the notion that actors (individuals, groups, organizations or 
even networks) can, at any moment, be characterized by a repertoire. Repertoires are defined 
as stabilized ways of thinking and acting (on the individual level) or stabilized codes, operations 
and technology5 (on the other levels). The concept of repertoire is akin to ‘frame’ (Giddens, 
1984: 87) ‘scheme’ and ‘definition of the situation’ (e.g. Hewitt, 1984: 75-85, 139-151). 
Nevertheless I prefer ‘repertoire’ since it has a stronger connotation with behavioral patterns 
next to cognitive ones. When dealing with patterns on (inter-)organizational, these behavioral 
components, as they are encapsulated in procedures and technology, seem to be the even more 
important than their cognitive reflections (Cf. March and Simon, 1958: 177, who also use the 
term repertoire more or less in this sense; Allison, 1971: 72).   
The theoretical ideas about the genesis, interrelations, functioning and change of repertoires 
can be summarized as follows: 
· repertoires are the residuals of preceding interaction processes in which meanings and 
behaviors are constructed and have acquired a measure of self-evidence. The Court of 
Audit is characterized by certain procedures, normative frameworks etc. that reflect a de-
velopmental process over time. Also governmental agencies have their acquired ideas on 
aims, policy instruments, limits of steering, role of other actors  etc. , which will color their 
perception of and reaction to evaluations 
· different actors have different repertoires, because they have different histories, different 
experiences, different positions, and different relations. Thus, the Court of Audit and a gov-
ernmental agency may apply different criteria to judge the effectiveness or legitimacy of a 
policy. 
· repertoires are used in the process of sensemaking and construction of behavior. 
Individuals and groups apply their existing ways of thinking and acting in order to give mean-
ing to new inputs and to react upon them. This implies that impacts of evaluations are not 
determined by the logic of the evaluator, but by the repertoire based interpretations and 
(re)actions of the agent involved. 
· Since different actors have different repertoires, they continuously produce behaviors 
that are not self-evident for (some) other actors. To a certain extent these other actors 
are confronted with equivocality. A governmental unit receiving an unexpected evaluation is 
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puzzled: what does it mean? The unit will be inclined to reduce this equivocality in order to 
give meaning to the evaluation and to react to it. By definition the existing repertoire is insuf-
ficient in this connection. The repertoire will change somewhat by consequence6. This proc-
ess of change can be called ‘learning’. 
· Repertoires are connected. Individuals generally are involved in multiple, partly related 
social contexts. A minister functions in political circles in which party ideologies, parliamen-
tary majorities and accountability probably are central in the dominant repertoire. On the 
other hand the minister also is an administrator and perhaps to a certain extent even a man-
ager focused on economy and effectiveness. And he also is a partner in consultations with 
societal groups and organizations, which may involve repertoires in which cooperation, and 
harmony and support may be central themes. In reacting on evaluations, all these repertoires 
will play a role. On the one hand this implies that different repertoires become linked to each 
other. On the other hand it follows that, at the group or organizational or network level the 
dominant repertoire is never fully shared by the constituting individuals, subgroups, depart-
ments or representatives of organizations. We say that different individuals or subgroups are 
included in different repertoires to a larger or smaller extent. This implies that in processes 
of sensemaking at the group and organizational level – and perhaps even at the individual 
level – equivocality (or multiplicity) is not only coming from other actors, but also from 
within: the process of sensemaking (reducing equivocality) also produces equivocality. 
· Repertoire elements are anchored in different ways. Repertoire-elements often will be not 
only anchored in the isolated repertoire concerned, but also in other repertoires and hence in 
relations with other actors. On the one hand this is a consequence of the interconnection 
between repertoires discussed above. The results of an evaluation study are not only made 
sense of from the dominant repertoire of the governmental unit, but also from individual 
repertoires (perhaps referring to the personal career) or from the perspective of consulting 
bodies in which the unit is represented. On the other hand the anchoring of repertoire ele-
ments in other repertoires is a consequence of the fact that third actors always play a role. 
Sensemaking and construction of reactions within the unit never takes place in isolation. At 
the very least it will anticipate upon reactions of other actors in the policy area. And when 
the evaluation study is public (as is generally the case at some point of time with Court of 
Audit investigations), actual reactions of other actors are available during the sensemaking 
and construction process, which will be influenced consequently. 
· Learning requires loosening of anchors and/or the development of new links. New links in 
the sense of new connections between repertoire elements, or in the sense of including new 
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elements in the repertoire, seem to be more probable if there is a certain overlap between 
repertoires. In our case, this concerns the repertoire of the Court of Audit and the one of the 
governmental unit, e.g. concerning the framework for judgement of performance. But again, 
constructing the impact of evaluation is not a bilateral process. It involves other actors as 
well. One can imagine that a governmental unit considers the results of an evaluation rather 
irrelevant (because it comes from ‘an other world’), but that the evaluation at the same time 
gets much positive attention in press or in Parliament. Changes in the repertoire of the focal 
unit may then not be a consequence of the content of the evaluation as such, but of meaning-
ful reactions of third parties. 
 
The implication of this argument is that we need to have an image of the major repertoires (by 
definition plural) in the policy area, if we are to understand when and how evaluation has which 
effects. But, although this may help to interpret results in retrospect, our ambition should be a bit 
higher. How is it determined which elements of evaluation get attention, what are the meanings 
they get, and when and how does which translation to organizational behavior take place? It is to 
these mechanisms and conditions that our7 research project is devoted. Two of the cases we 
studied are described below. They will be explored in terms of the theoretical framework 
outlined above, in order to generate a number of more specific hypotheses on the impact of 
evaluation on governmental learning. 
The Court of Audit 
The Court of Audit (CoA)8 is an independent institution, with constitutional auditing tasks and 
authority. Originally its main task was to ascertain whether government expenditures were in 
accordance with the law. Gradually new elements were introduced, such as assessments of 
efficiency, effectiveness, and effects of specific policies and audits on organization and manage-
ment. These new types of activities have been anchored in successive adaptations of the 
Government Accounts Act, in part as a canonization of existing practices (Dolmans, 1989; 
Leeuw, 1992). The Court of Audit proper consists of three members. The supporting organiza-
tion (almost 350 people) is divided in a number of sections, each heading a number of 
departmental bureaus. These latter units, which perform most of the basic research and maintain 
most of the contacts with the departments of government, are in most cases physically located 
inside those departments.  
 The usual procedure in efficiency/effectiveness/effect studies starts with a proposal for 
(further) study by the departmental bureau. Such a proposal is based on the one hand on their 
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contacts with the department, observations of what is going on, or monitoring what happens with 
previous CoA studies. On the other hand the strategic plan for a five-year period and the year 
plan of the CoA are the framework within which the proposals are made. If the Court endorses 
the proposal, the research is done, using written materials from the department, other internal or 
external evaluations and audits, interviews with actors within and outside the department, etc. 
The resulting report of findings is checked with collaborators of the department. This often leads 
to adaptations in the report. After the Court has given its consent, the Minister involved is asked 
to react. The results are summarized in periodical reports (such as the year report) or sometimes 
in a separate, more extensive publication. In both cases the CoA includes a short account of the 
reaction of the Minister and its own comments on this reaction in the final report, which is sent to 
the Parliament and sometimes gets substantial press coverage. 
 
The Lynx9 
In 1974 the Dutch Minister of Defense planned the procurement of 36 ‘standard’ helicopters for 
the Royal Dutch Navy. In the same year the Westland WG-13 (Lynx) was chosen. Between 
1975 and 1983 24 Lynx helicopters were actually bought, in three versions (A, B and C). The 
last 12 were postponed and later canceled because a new project to replace the Lynx by a new 
helicopter (NH-90) was already underway.  
 
On March 10, 1987, the Court of Audit (CoA) published its report on procurement and 
availability of the Lynx. The findings of the CoA can be summarized as follows: 
· There was no clear set of criteria and no clear plan in the procurement process. 
· There was no real (price) competition between producers, because of too quick a choice for 
the Westland Lynx. 
· Standardization was a failure, because three different versions were procured and no 
international coordination of procurement took place. 
· Information to Parliament was fragmentary and incomplete. Initially NGL 192 million was 
budgeted for 24 helicopters, while eventually NGL 361 million was paid. These facts were 
only reported to Parliament in bits and pieces. It was unclear whether these amounts in-
cluded sensors, weapons, spare parts, documentation, training etc. There never was a total 
overview. 
· Bad arrangements concerning price adaptations. 
· An alarming lack of readiness of the helicopters (less than 40%) and low availability of spare 
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parts. 
 
Did the investigations of the CoA and their results evoke learning processes within the Ministry 
of Defense, and if so, which and with what observable results? At first sight this looks like an 
almost unanswerable question. If a change takes place after the publication of a report, it is not 
at all sure that it is a consequence of the report. One day after the report appeared the Ministry 
issued a situation report on the Lynx. But why did it do so? There may be other reasons then the 
CoA report. Even if there is a change that seems congruent with the findings of the report, a 
causal connection is not self-evident. On the other hand if a change precedes the report, that 
change might be the consequence of anticipation of it. Even if changes prior to or after the 
report are not congruent with its contents, they still may be triggered by the report. Moreover, 
policy changes, or changes in organizational practices hardly ever have only a single cause, while 
on the other hand a single input (the CoA report) may have differential – and even contradictory 
- effects on different actors or subgroups. 
 
But the theoretical framework presented above does not suggest to search primarily for direct 
correspondence between the contents of an evaluation report and changes in policy or manage-
ment, but draws our attention towards the social construction processes of these changes. Below 
I present a partial report10 on the reconstruction that we made of the Lynx case. We proceeded 
as follows: 
· From the CoA report, Defense Budgets, Parliamentary and other public documents, we built 
a picture of the major developments, debates and measures with respect to procurement and 
readiness of the Lynx, just to have a starting point and a ‘context’ for our further research.  
· After that we studied the CoA-archive with respect to the report. From this we gained an 
image of the steps and interactions preceding the report, including the exchange of informa-
tion and views with the Ministry and with the Navy. 
· On the bases of the preceding two points we made tentative list of relevant actors and a list 
of issues we would like to have their view on, because these might mirror the relevant parts 
of their repertoires. 
· Next we conducted interviews with different actors11 in order to complement our images of 
the relevant developments, the relevant repertoires of the actors involved, their perceptions 
of and reactions to the CoA report and to the reactions of others. In doing so we also com-
plemented our image of changes in repertoires and how they came about. 
· Finally, based on the preceding steps and utilizing the structural constructivist theoretical 
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framework, we made a tentative explanation of the governmental learning processes related 
to the inputs generated by the CoA.  
 
Below I summarize this reconstruction in two steps. First, I give a short description of the 
repertoires of a number of key actors, viz. the CoA (and more specifically Bureau Defense of 
the CoA), the Navy, and the political leadership of the Ministry of Defense. Second, I describe 
and explain the reactions of the latter two actors and their consequences, referring to the three 
repertoires. Of course there are more actors and more repertoires. Reference to these will be 
made when necessary. The same holds for sub-units within the actors just mentioned. But a 
reconstruction on the level of interaction between (and within) these three actors will suffice to 
demonstrate the approach and to generate a number of fruitful conclusions and hypotheses to be 
formulated by the end of this paper. 
 
The tables below summarize some characteristics of the dominant repertoires that appeared to 
be relevant in our case study. We derived them from utterances of members of the units 
involved, and – as far as the CoA is concerned – also from written reflections (Bemelmans-
Videc,  1998) 
Court of Audit (Bureau Defense) 
General: 
· The CoA is independent and bases its assessment on factual data. 
· The CoA chooses subjects, timing and forms of presentation that will enhance actual use of the 
reports in policy processes. 
· The main aim of ‘value for money’ investigations12 of the CoA is to assess the extent to which 
initial policy goals are realized, the economy of spending, and the efficiency of implementation. 
· Clear information and control are essential to realize value for money. 
· CoA investigations have a preventive and sometimes a correcting effect. 
Bureau Defense 
· Good relations with the units evaluated (in this case the Ministry of Defense and the Navy) are 
necessary as a precondition both for obtaining relevant information and for a constructive 
reception of findings. And in fact the relations are considered good. 
· The Navy is inclined to give top priority to technological sophistication. This is understandable, 
but the CoA should remain critical at this point. 
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Navy 
· Navy operations are core business. Of course, in a democracy, giving information to parliament 
and financial accountability etc. are necessary. But these should not preempt effective and 
efficient operations management. 
· Quality and efficiency means buying the best technology that can be afforded with available 
budgets. 
· The tactical and strategic concepts of the Navy are not mere ideas, but have been anchored in 
the past in the military hardware procured. 
· Procuring advanced military systems is not buying from the shelf. You hook on to a develop-
ment process that is underway. It is a sellers market. Deviation from contractual specifications 
is often necessary, but unavoidably leads to much higher costs. 
· CoA evaluations generally are useful, though they often lack expertise. 
 
Political leadership 
· It is always necessary to weigh different interest (which may be military-strategic in nature, or 
related to foreign or industrial policy). 
· Parliamentary support is paramount. 
· (From the beginning of the eighties) reduction of budgets, control of spending. 
· Gradual introduction of new internal control mechanisms for defense procurement.  
· Fear for negative publicity. 
· Navy is very capable and has high expertise. But they are rather ‘closed’ and hard to control. 
· CoA investigations are primarily useful for civil service and perhaps for the Navy, but not so 
much for the political leadership. 
 
General reactions to the CoA Lynx report 
 
According to our Navy informants, the CoA report was a traumatic experience to the Navy13. 
There was a kind of double reaction. On the one hand terror: ‘Is it so bad?’ And on the other 
hand resentment ‘We are judged far too negatively’. Also fear arose with respect to the public 
image of the Navy. These general feelings contributed, according these respondents, to an 
increased attention for presentation and accountability of procurement projects. There were also 
pressures from the political level in more or less the same direction: budget control and 
businesslike procedures. But still, these activities kept being seen as an extra burden that tends to 
interfere with the core operations.  
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 These reactions from the Navy are quite understandable from the professional self-
image anchored in its dominant repertoire. Although the Navy does not share the normative 
framework applied by the CoA (see also below), a number of CoA comments clearly hook on to 
key notions of good and reliable management and of the professional image the Navy is proud 
of. The consecutive behavioral change may, therefore, well be interpreted in terms of organiza-
tional learning in which part of the repertoire (concerning accountability, transparency, contacts 
with politicians and public relations) changes to maintain and strengthen other parts of the 
repertoire (professional control, advanced technology, quality and efficiency). 
With the political leadership the report also induced a double reaction. On the one hand 
the Minister explicitly recognizes imperfections in the procurement process and level of 
readiness. On the other hand, with a view on the international and technological circumstances, 
the political leadership had the impression that an alternative course of events would not have 
been really possible.  So the CoA report seems to have confirmed the idea that the Navy was 
hard to control and that improvements in the procurement process (introduced mainly because of 
the need for tighter financial control) justified. At the same time the repertoire of the political 
leadership implied much confidence in the Navy and a high sensitivity for difficulties in decision 
making and planning in a dynamic environment. From this it is quite understandable that much of 
the CoA critique was considered too exaggerated or even beside the point.  
These general attitudes with respect to the CoA report seem to play an important role in 
the verbal and substantial (re)actions on specific points, which we found in documents and heard 
in interviews. 
 
Planning 
 
The CoA critique that there were no clear goals and by consequence no clear planning at the 
start of the Lynx procurement project is quite understandable from the CoA repertoire. Since 
there is no clear goal, its attainment can hardly be assessed. Besides, from the point of view of 
the CoA the procurement process is very whimsical, which means that it is hard to assess and 
evaluate the actual Lynx procurement process. This is even more problematic since there is no 
comprehensive financial overview.  
To the Navy, on the contrary, a relatively open goal formulation at the outset is an asset, because 
it allows for flexible adaptation to new developments and circumstances. This is in conformity 
with the drive to procure the most advanced systems. Hence the Navy tries to keep this 
openness.  
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The Minister and his Deputy essentially agreed with the substance of the CoA critique 
at this point. They claimed however that improvements were underway. New procurement 
procedures for large projects were implemented (Dutch acronym: DMP). These improvements, 
according to the Minister, were initiated independent of the CoA investigations14. But the feeling 
that the Navy is hard to control still existed in the political leadership. Here we see that the CoA 
reinforces a repertoire change that is already underway, be it partly for other reasons. 
 
Competition 
 
The CoA report argued that economy in spending of public means implies organizing maximal 
competition between suppliers, and that, by consequence, an early choice for one vendor is ill 
advised. This position is consistent with the focus on economy, which is central in the CoA 
repertoire  
The Navy considered this point nonsense: ‘You don’t buy a (military) helicopter in the 
supermarket, you invest in a development trajectory’. At the time there was, according to the 
Navy (and the then Minister), simply no alternative to the Lynx development trajectory. We 
could not trace any substantial action or change in or by the Navy related to this point. There 
seems to be no new connection between repertoire elements in this respect, which can be 
understood from the very large differences between the repertoires concerned 
Although the political leadership was subtler in its reaction (they claimed that studies 
performed before the Lynx was chosen can be considered as applying competition to a certain 
extent), they too kept holding that there was no alternative. 
 
Standardization 
 
With respect to standardization there was a more or less clear goal at the start: both internal and 
international standardization should be striven for. From the CoA repertoire it is natural that the 
CoA made a point of the fact that neither form of standardization was realized.  
The Navy consideres standardization as a value in its own right, but it is not given high-
est priority. Adaptation to military-strategic and technological developments is  considered at 
least as important. The Navy feels that sensible spending of public money is buying the best you 
can get. This way of thinking is so strongly anchored in the repertoire that it often appears in 
mere technical terms: ‘The Lynx-A appeared too light to carry the sensors and weapons 
required’ (my emphasis – FBvdM). Therefore, even in retrospect, within the Navy one does not 
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see how the procurement process  (three versions) could have been otherwise. 
The political leadership had two somewhat contradictory reactions at this point. On the 
one hand it felt that the CoA was unfair in giving no due attention to technological and political 
developments during the procurement process. To their mind, the Navy should not be forced to 
work with systems that are technologically and conceptually outdated. On the other hand 
standardization is considered desirable from the point of view of efficiency, reliability, readiness 
and cost control. This combination of reactions, which both are clearly related to their repertoire, 
lead the policy makers to an effort to standardize ex post. In 1986 the Project Unit for the 
Maintenance of the Lynx15 was charged with this task, which was also intended to extend the 
operational period of the Lynx. The CoA did not suggest this solution. Nevertheless the CoA 
investigations may well have played a role 16. It is also probable that Parliament played a role in 
this connection. Parliament made many remarks on financial aspects of the Lynx project, but 
also on the standardization problem. It asked why the political leadership did not interfere in an 
earlier stage. From the repertoire of the political leadership, it seems natural to take measures by 
consequence, if only to restore the image and trustworthiness of the political leadership.  
 
Information to Parliament 
 
The CoA stated that Parliament never has had complete and clear information on the financial 
aspects of the Lynx procurement project. From the financial control role of the CoA (and 
Parliament!) it is clear that the CoA considers this a major point. 
From the perspective of the Navy, on the contrary, this initially is a less relevant prob-
lem. Nevertheless the Navy recognized that Parliament has the right to get more information. 
Besides, responsible functionaries within the Navy perceived that Parliament and political 
leadership were quite sensitive to the CoA critique at this point. The Navy therefore felt forced 
to provide more information. Although they kept considering it as an extra burden, they gradually 
discovered an unexpected advantage of increased interaction with members of Parliament: it 
increased the lobby opportunities for the Navy and enhanced early commitment of key members 
of Parliament to Navy projects. Eventually a clear change in external information and relations 
management by the Navy can be observed. Again we see a change that is not explicitly 
advocated by the CoA, but seems to be enhanced, if not triggered by it.  
The Minister claimed (at least officially) that information to Parliament had been suffi-
cient in all stages. Nevertheless gradual changes in the amount and nature of information to 
Parliament can be observed, probably to maintain support of Parliament, which is a key issue in 
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the repertoire of the political leadership. 
 
Price control 
 
The control of spending and prices, was also a major point of attention in the CoA repertoire. 
The Navy, however, was not impressed by CoA critique in this respect. It was used to 
substantial increases in prices, high cost of adaptations in design and high cost for building in 
equipment. This has to do with the nature of technology and technological development and with 
the suppliers controlled market. Moreover inflation and exchange rates play a substantial role. 
Finally the attitude of the Navy, in contrast with the standards of the CoA, is not to buy things as 
cheap as you can, but buying the best with the money that appears to be available.  
The responsible politicians tried, both on their own account and under the perceived 
pressure of the CoA and Parliament, to gain more control of the financial aspects of procure-
ment processes. The procedures of DMP are an example in case. Moreover, already in 1984 a 
Contract Commission was erected within the central core of the Ministry. This Commission 
played, according to the Deputy Minister, an increasing role in the negotiations of new contracts. 
This amounted to frictions between the central department and the Navy with respect to the 
question who actually is (responsible for) negotiating procurement contracts. Here we see that 
CoA critique (reinforced by Parliament) links easily with notions in the political leadership 
(budget control, control of the procurement process) and influences the relation between 
Ministry and Navy in the direction of more openness and control of the latter. 
 
Readiness 
 
The very low readiness of the Lynx reported by the CoA hitted the Navy in its core. The first 
reaction was one of unbelief and irritation. According to our Navy informants, the CoA appeared 
to lack expertise. For example, many disturbances and failures were caused by the relatively 
high trembling of the Lynx as a consequence of its rotor suspension, and so unavoidable. The 
CoA reacted by pointing out that this probably demonstrates that the Lynx was a bad choice. 
But the Navy was supported in its image of the lack of expertise of the CoA: the specific rotor 
suspension made the helicopter very maneuverable, a splendid machine! The high failure rate 
should be taken as necessary costs. The CoA critique on the bad stock keeping of spare parts 
was also rejected initially. Spare parts are very expensive, in part they were not even developed, 
and you cannot know in advance which parts will have to be replaced. The Navy saw the lack 
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of a sufficient number of crews as a consequence of training problems, certification and 
competition with civil aviation. 
But still, the CoA critique hurted because the Navy cannot escape the conclusion that 
essentially the CoA was right: a readiness of about 40% is far too low. A number of measures 
were taken. The first one was primarily presentation: the definition of readiness was changed, 
which lead to somewhat higher percentages. But more fundamental was a large-scale reorgani-
zation of the maintenance activities in order to perform faster, well structured and mission 
oriented maintenance. Finally cooperation was sought with a number of other European 
countries to create a joint pool of spare parts. Here the CoA critique obviously links with the 
professional self-image of the Navy, which explains the dual reaction of discrediting the critique 
and reacting to it by changing organization and procedures. 
 
Intermediate conclusion 
 
The Lynx case shows how the theoretical framework of structural constructivism can be used to 
account for (lack of) organizational learning related to CoA evaluations. Based on the analysis a 
number of conditions and mechanisms producing certain forms of organizational learning can be 
identified. However, before doing so, it seems useful to enlarge the empirical bases for some 
tentative hypotheses by giving a condensed description of a second case study in which some 
other mechanisms appear to play a role.  
 
The state museums17 
The report 
 
In October and November 1987 the CoA investigated the performance of the state museums 
with respect to conservation of cultural objects and with respect to their tasks directed at the 
general public. These were the main officially stated task of the museums. Next to that, the CoA 
explicitly devoted attention to the quality of the management of the museums.  
Within a period of three weeks all state museums were investigated, on the one hand to 
prevent anticipation by the museums and on the other hand in order to be able to report quickly. 
This approach required working with parallel teams, in part consisting of CoA officials usually 
dealing with other policy fields. 
The report, eventually published in September 1988, was quite critical. It mentions seri-
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ous problems with respect to registration, conservation, management, security, personnel and 
financial relations with supportive foundations. Also the public service functions in a number of 
museums are judged to be below standard. The CoA asks for more attention for conservation, 
better management and uniform and transparent financial regulations. The CoA thinks a 
‘(direction of) solutions for the problems identified’ a necessary condition before museums can 
be granted more autonomy. 
 
The CoA repertoire 
 
The table below summarizes core CoA repertoire elements. 
Court of Audit 
· assessment of realization of initially formulated goals 
· good managerial and financial control mechanisms are an important guarantee for good 
policy implementation 
· uniform and transparent regulations are important 
· timing of reports to induce actual use and influence in the political process 
 
It is interesting to note that during the eighties a clear development took place in the CoA 
repertoire18. Both ‘political’ timing and attention paid to management and control are new 
elements, which are reflected in the approach in the museums case. The timing of the report is 
directly and explicitly related to the actual discussion within the ministry on privatization of the 
state museums.  The focus on the organization and management of the museums reflects both 
this current political issue and the growing CoA interest in institutionalized control. 
 
The impact 
 
Within the framework of this contribution I limit myself to an account of the reaction of the 
Minister to the report and the use he made of it. In doing so, I try to explain his policy from his 
repertoire and the administrative interactions in which he was involved. 
 
In his formal reaction, the Minister agreed to a very large extent with the CoA report. He 
considered the arrears in conservation ‘very alarming’ and he did not deny the other problems 
identified by the CoA. However, he felt that the CoA to a large extent did not consider the 
causes of these problems, nor the impediments for their solution. He thought that the fact that 
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different Ministries are involved in the financial, control and policy aspects of the museums 
creates much inefficiency and lack of efficaciousness, because of bureaucratic procedures and 
equivocal steering. In general, the fact that the state museums are part of public administration 
hinders improvement, amongst others because of the lack of financial incentives for new 
creative initiatives and public oriented activities. From this interpretation of the problems, more 
autonomy appeared as a sensible solution. The Minister was determined to move in that 
direction.  
Note that the Minister buys the problem assessment of the CoA, but is heading for a so-
lution quite contrary to the CoA argument. Both elements of this reaction can be understood 
from the repertoire of the Minister and his staff and the meaning the CoA report acquired in 
their interpretation of it.   
The Minister’s reaction reflects changes in the repertoire of the Ministry taking place in the 
years preceding the CoA report. I summarize the main developments19. 
· debate on core business. From the beginning of the eighties, a debate developed, especially 
from within the Ministry, with respect to the question what the main tasks of the state are in 
relation to museums. Initia lly this debate was linked to efforts to separate the responsibilities 
of different levels of government in this connection, and to cuts in the state budget. But later 
on a new element came on the agenda. It concerned the growing uneasiness associated with 
the combination of a general responsibility for culture policy and a specific management 
responsibility for a selected number of museums. From these elements in the debate the 
notion was constructed that the Minister only has a responsibility at the macro level (includ-
ing conservation of the total national cultural inheritance) and not on the micro level of mu-
seum management. Some groups within the Ministry however sticked to a more comprehen-
sive role of the Ministry. 
· autonomy and privatization. The idea of more autonomy for the state museums, increas-
ingly discussed within the Ministry and more and more in public, was connected with budget 
cuts as well. A decision to privatize the Dutch Open-air Museum was primarily anchored in 
this consideration. But soon the idea that more autonomy may enhance the performance of 
museums and solve many problems accordingly, acquired a central place in the debate. The 
factions within the Department promoting privatization were gaining ground, although other 
factions resisted the idea. Within the circle of the state museums there was dissension: some 
museums were quite enthusiastic about the idea, others were more reluctant. The former 
expected reduction of bureaucracy and room for own policy development, the latter feared 
that government would drastically reduce its (financial) responsibility.  
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· conservation. Already in 1984 the Ministry recognized arrears in conservation of national 
heritage. In the following years, the awareness of the problems kept growing and the as-
sessment of the situation became increasingly negative. The Ministry related the problem to 
the low management quality in the museums on the one hand and to the lack of financial 
means on the other. 
 
In sum, in the course of the eighties, the repertoire of some groups within the Ministry developed 
in a direction that facilitated links with the definitions of the problems of the museums as the 
CoA identified them in 1988. However, at the same time a repertoire with respect to solutions 
developed, which was in some respects at variance with the argument the CoA developed. It 
seems, then, that the CoA assessment of the shortcomings of the museums strengthened the 
repertoire and the position of groups with similar problem definitions. Consequently the solutions 
generated by these groups gained strength in the internal debate, which eventually may have 
contributed to the decision in 1991 to privatize the museums. For, although the CoA had rejected 
that solution for the near future, the CoA report was frequently cited to support the privatization 
proposals. 
Conclusions 
In this paper I have examined when and in what way (outcomes of) evaluation studies are used 
in governmental learning processes. I described two cases, in which the impact of CoA reports 
on policy making, control and management was (partly) reconstructed, using a structural 
constructivist theoretical framework. 
Both cases support the central ideas of the theory: 
· The impacts of evaluations are constructed by actors, using their existing repertoires. 
· These construction processes do not take place in isolation but in a context of other actors 
and other construction processes. For example the impact of the Lynx report is clearly 
related to the interaction between the Ministry and the Navy. The impact of the museum 
report must be understood in the context of ongoing interactions within the Ministry and 
between Ministry and museums, resulting in new repertoires. 
· A decisive point in determining the substantial impact of evaluation lies in the linking of 
(new) elements in the evaluations to (elements in) existing repertoires and/or in their contri-
bution to loosening existing anchors of repertoire elements. The CoA critique on readiness of 
the Lynx links to the professional self-image of the Navy, resulting in adaptations not sug-
gested by the CoA. The museum report strengthens repertoires “under construction” within 
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the Ministry. 
· Often elements of evaluation link to the repertoires of certain actors or factions. Conse-
quently, changes in relations between these actors or factions and other groups show up. 
The consecutive interaction processes determine the eventual links and the further develop-
ments. Here the museum case provides a clear example. 
 
In the case studies actual developments were interpreted ex post in terms of social construction 
processes. However, inspired by the insight the case analysis gave, it is possible to derive more 
general hypotheses that are consistent with the theory developed in this contribution. When 
operationalized adequately, these hypotheses can be tested. Here, I confine myself to a number 
of examples. 
 
Evaluations will have direct effects if they link to the existing repertoire of the unit involved. As 
is clear from the case studies, such links often are partial. There may be some overlap with 
respect to performance criteria, or with respect to problem definitions, or with respect to policy 
options, or with respect to assessment of relevant contexts, etc., but not on all those dimensions. 
The direction and intensity of effects will probably depend on the nature and the measure of 
overlap. This gives rise to a first hypothesis: 
 
hypothesis 1: direct effects of evaluation on units evaluated reflect the nature and 
measure of links between the repertoires involved: (a) arguments and recommen-
dations based on overlapping repertoire elements will be taken up by the unit 
evaluated, at least insofar they are not perceived as contradictory with other rep-
ertoire elements; (b) assessments made in an evaluation that fit in the repertoire of 
the unit evaluated, will be taken as support and reinforce the repertoire, irrespec-
tive of how such assessments are used in arguments of the evaluator; (c) redefini-
tion of repertoires of units evaluated is connected to overlapping parts of reper-
toires. 
 
From the cases it is also clear that units evaluated are no monoliths. This leads to a second 
hypothesis: 
 
hypothesis 2: to the extent that assessments and recommendations of evaluations do 
link more closely to the repertoires of certain individuals or factions within the 
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unit evaluated, or to developments in those repertoires, their effects will be 
stronger and in the direction advocated by these individuals or factions. 
 
 
Insofar as my analysis is convincing, it may have a number of consequences for evaluation 
practices. As I said in the introduction, evaluation may have different purposes or functions. My 
suggestions (which in a sense are hypotheses as well) only pertain to the function of enhancing 
learning processes. 
 
· If evaluation is to enhance organizational learning processes, the mode and content of the 
evaluation should link to the repertoire of one or more actors involved. Linkage can occur via 
the content of the evaluation, the standards used by the evaluator, anticipation by actors on 
reactions of other actors, or in other direct or indirect ways. Therefore, it may help evalua-
tors if they gain knowledge of the repertoires of key actors. 
· Knowledge of repertoires can also help to initiate explicit discussion on central presupposi-
tions, value orientations etc. that are embedded in these repertoires. This may give rise to 
another type of learning process than mere discussion of specific behaviors, because it may 
enhance other interaction processes and other linkages. 
· Moreover, knowledge of different repertoires may help to tailor evaluation to trigger 
unconventional interactions in the policy area, which may give rise to new types of learning 
processes. 
· Evaluators, like other actors, perceive and analyze, using their own repertoire. They take 
substantive positions accordingly. In general there is nothing wrong with that. Such a posi-
tion, however controversial, may trigger interaction and learning processes that give rise to 
changes that many may consider improvements. Looking for new links is something quite 
different from taking other actors positions without critique. But it is useful to be able to 
evaluate one’s own positions from the point of view of other actors. 
· An essential element of evaluation aiming at learning should be to take account of the 
relevant context and developments in it as perceived by the actors in the policy area. A 
number of comments in the CoA report on the Lynx (on lack of competition and standardiza-
tion) were not taken very seriously within the Navy because they confirmed the idea that the 
CoA lived in another world. Again this point should not imply that the evaluator should take 
for granted the context as actors see it, but only that they acknowledge that that context is 
there in the present repertoires of the actors and hence will reinforce their ways of 
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(re)acting. 
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Notes 
 1  Mastop and Faludi ( 1993) suggest in an article on the impact of strategic policy, that because 
of the types of complications mentioned in the text, one should concentrate on ‘use’, irrespective 
of its direction. I do not agree, for I believe that both theoretical analysis and empirical research 
has more to offer. 
2 I refrain here from the question whether there exist still other types of organizational change. It 
may be suggested that some actors have the ‘power’ to force units evaluated to change, even if 
those units have not learned anything from the evaluation. But even then, organizational behavior 
  
 
 
  
changes as a consequence of new experiences, information and/or interactions, which I defined 
as learning. Moreover, from the perspective adopted here, power is only ‘operational’ to the 
extent and in the way it is reproduced in interaction. 
3 Perhaps organizational learning is after all a good metaphor for individual learning processes, 
because the latter unavoidably take place in a social context. This question, however, is outside 
de scope of this article as well. 
4 For a more comprehensive discussion of the theory see (Van der Meer and Roodink,  1991; 
Vissers,  1994). 
5 In a sense technology in organizations can be considered as perhaps the most reified and 
anchored way of thinking and acting: it structures organizational behavior in a way that is often 
both subconscious and experienced as hard to change. 
6 Weick thinks this process the core of ‘organizing’ which he defines as ‘a consensually 
validated grammar for reducing equivocality by sensible interlocked behaviors’ (Weick,  1979: 3) 
7 In the research I have collaborated with my colleagues Geert Vissers and Gert Jan de Vries. 
We have investigated learning processes triggered by five Court of Audit evaluations. 
8 For factual information about the CoA and its development over time see Stevers ( 1979) 
Dolmans (1989) and Leeuw, (1992). 
9  The following account is based on Parliamentary Documents and interviews. The documents 
are categorized under the following numbers: 12994, nr. 2 (Defense White book 1974), 13100, 
nr. 7 (Defense Budget 1975), 14600 nr. 12 (Report of the Minister of Defense, 1978), 18169 nr. 
2 and nr. 78 (Defense White Book 1984), 19282 nr. 2 to nr. 5 (Report of the Deputy Minister of 
Defense, 1985-1987) and 19897 nr. 1 to nr. 12 (CoA report on Lynx, 1987). 
10 A more comprehensive report is in preparation (in Dutch). 
11 Extensive interviews were conducted with a former Deputy Minister of Defense (1981-1989), 
the head air operations and a PR-officer of the Navy, and three members of the Defense 
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Bureau of the CoA that were involved in the Lynx report. 
12 In Dutch: ‘doelmatigheidsonderzoek’, i.e. assessment of efficiency, effectiveness and goal 
attainment. 
13 The same holds, to an even larger extent, for the CoA report on the procurement of the 
Walrus submarines, which appeared only one year and a half earlier. 
14 A Navy respondent, however, indicated that the Walrus report was the immediate cause of 
DMP. 
15 In Dutch: Projectbureau Instandhouding Lynx. 
16 The then Deputy Minister of Defense thinks that probably the CoA investigations were a very 
important direct reason for the erection of the Project Bureau. 
17 We used a.o. the Parliamentary Documents 19066 nr. 1 to nr. 35 (Memorandum on Museum 
Policy), 20697 nr. 1 to nr. 10 (CoA report on State Museums) and 21973 nr. 1 to nr. 5 (Memo-
randum on Privatization of Museums). We also conducted a large number of interviews with 
CoA officials involved, civil servants from the ministry and directors of museums. An extensive 
report of our research is in preparation. 
18 The explanation of this change, which can also be interpreted as the consequence of 
organizational learning processes, is outside the scope of this article. 
19 These developments too, can be analyzed as consequences of organizational learning 
processes. Again, however, this is outside the scope of this paper. 
